Evolution of Organizational Structure and Strategy of the Automobile Industry by Heng, S.H. & Wibbelink, R.
Faculteit der Economische Wetenschappen en Econometric
Evolution of Organizational Structure and Strategy of the
Automobile industry
R.l?  Wibbelink
M.S.H. Heng
R e s e a r c h  M e m o r a n d u m  2 0 0 0 - l  2
I vrije Universiteit amsterdam
A p r i l  2 0 0 0
Evolution of Organizational Structure and Strategy
of the Automobile Industry
R P Wibbelink and M S H Heng*
Faculty of Economics
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
* the second author is the correspondent author
Abstract: This paper is a historically oriented study of the automobile industry. It sets out to
understand why have the structure and strategy of the dominant companies in the automobile
industry changed in the way they have done. Our findings suggest three factors at work, namely
the knowledge of car production and of customers, the capability of the technological system, and
the business environment. The knowledge system represents the level of know-how and the
availability of information. In a sense the knowledge system in the automobile industry refers to
the level and the degree of diffusion of knowledge of how to make a car on the one hand and the
know-how of customer demands on the other hand. In the history of the automobile industry the
knowledge system has improved continuously and gradually. The technological system of car
production consists of clusters of technologies that together form the technological base necessary
to support or shape the car production. The business environment refers to the social system
(economy, prosperity), the market system (the quantity and direction of the market demand), the
intensity level of competition, the culture, the legislation, etc.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The centennial history of the automobile industry may be seen as a history of continuous
incremental improvement of a business system that goes through a few stages. The automobile
industry has developed from craftwork in the 19th century into a very complex industry today. It
has produced a series of innovative management practices that shaped and are still shaping the
industrial landscape all over the world. Henry Ford invented the moving assembly line, which has
become an enduring symbol of industrialisation.  Later, Alfred Sloan reorganized General Motors
into a model for the modem corporation with its operating divisions, marketing plans and planned
obsolescence. More recently, Toyota’s crafting of lean production ushered in a general revolution
in manufacturing. Therefore it is no surprise that the industry has been a source of influential
ideas for management researchers. Nowadays it is one of the most competitive industries and one
of the highest export earners. Large automobile companies are becoming global players and with
annual sales of around a trillion dollars, the industry accounts for at least one in ten jobs in the
industrialized countries. Developing countries continue to see their carmakers as a symbol of
industrial progress and vitality.
As observed by Rae (1984) and Womack et al (1990),  there are stages in the evolution of the
automobile industry. Each of these stages has been dominated by one type of organizational
structure and strategy. Each time after a period of success the dominant type of organization is
replaced by another. The central question in this paper is:
Why have the structure and strategy of the dominant companies in the automobile industry
changed in the way they have done?
The beginning of the automobile industry was characterized by craft production. The
organizations were extremely decentralized and many of the skilled craftsmen were their own
bosses, serving as independent contractors within a plant. This mode of production was not
efficient and was unable to introduce innovation. It was the genius of Ford to solve such problems
while incorporating innovations and technological advancement then currently obtaining. His
name is thus closely associated with vertically integrated and centrally controlled organizations
evolved during the early years of the 20th century. The new form of organization for car
production was so successful that it virtually eliminated the craft organization. The growth of the
automobile industry brought about more technical know-how about automobile production and
increased competition. These, together with other changes in the business environment, posed
new challenges to Ford who somehow failed to respond effectively. He was to lose out to Sloan
who introduced in the 1930s a more decentralized organization. The decentralized mode of mass
production was to dominate the automobile industry for decades. This in turn failed to respond to
the greater availability of knowledge of car production, the improved capacity of the
technological system and the more competitive environment. The prize went to the lean
production system which found favour among the major automobile companies in the 1980s. The
lean producers introduced a pull concept of production and used extensive subcontracting in order
to co-ordinate the supply chain. In the 1990s automobile companies are downsizing, focusing on
their core business in order to become more efficient and more effective than ever before.
Our findings suggest three factors, namely, the knowledge of car production and of
customers, the capability of the technological system, and the business environment. The knowl-
edge system represents the level of know-how and the availability of information. In a sense the
knowledge system in the automobile industry represents the level and the degree of diffusion of
knowledge of how to make a car on the one hand and the know-how of customer demands on the
other hand. In the history of the automobile industry the knowledge system has improved
continuously and gradually. The technological system of car production consists of clusters of
technologies that together form the technological base necessary to support or shape the car
production. The business environment refers to the social system (economy, prosperity), the
market system (the quantity and direction of the market demand), the intensity level of com-
petition, the culture, the legislation, etc.
This paper is a historically oriented study of the automobile industry. The approach shapes
the structure of the paper. The following sections (section 2 to 5) look at the craft production, the
mass production, decentralised  organization, lean production, and network organization. Section
6 concludes the paper.
2 CRAFT PRODUCTION
In the late 19th century, the first gasoline-powered cars were being built in Europe. The
organizations were extremely decentralized; general purpose machine tools were used to perform
drilling, grinding and other operations on metal and wood. The craftsmen hand built expensive
cars in very small numbers; per year 1,000 or fewer cars were produced world-wide.
The automobile industry consisted of a large number of very small companies. The
competition was not fierce and the automobile makers focused on expensive, custom-made cars.
The type of organizational structure may be identified as a network organization. Exchanges
between organizations were conducted through the market using money as the medium of
exchange and contract as the medium of co-ordination. Many of the skilled craftsmen in an
automobile company were their own bosses, often serving as independent contractors within a
plant, or as independent machine-shop owners with whom the company contracted for specific
parts or components.
The network organization based on craft had a number of drawbacks. Contractors sometimes
operated with guile, for them the need to provide exactly what the manufacturer expected was not
particularly high (Clegg, 1990). After all there was no fierce competition. As a result it was
possible for contractors to optimize their own short-term businesses without having to fear nega-
tive consequences. Control over the contractors was hard to establish. And if contractors did try to
provide exactly what the automobile maker requested it was not always possible. Making cars
meant prototyping; consistency and reliability were elusive. It was not possible to produce two of
the same cars, even if they were built to the same blueprints.
Production costs per unit were high and did not drop significantly with volume. Because
there was no systematic research it was hardly possible to develop new technologies. The low
level of the knowledge of building a car and the limited tools and materials were also barriers for
the network organization to function properly.
The network organizations then could not expand dramatically in their existing form because
of another reason. At that time there was no mass demand for the cars produced. In fact the prod-
uct was perceived as an expensive toy of the rich; it was their willingness to indulge in an
expensive hobby that enabled the industry to get going.
3 FORD’S MASS PRODUCTION SYSTEM
By 1900 several companies were established with the aim to build commercial vehicles, with
investors and craftsmen joining forces to achieve this. According to Chandler (1964),  key
problems were production and finance. One may add another, the creation of a mass market.
During the early years of the 20th century Henry Ford found a way to overcome these problems.
The second stage of the history of the automobile industry was characterized by the mass produc-
tion system that was largely pioneered by him. The introduction of the Model-T in 1908 opened
this period. A relevant question is: how did the mass production system take over the network
organization?
During the 19th century the United States was transformed from an essential rural economy
into an urban economy, based on the technological developments ushered in by the Industrial
Revolution. There was an ample supply of workers who were used to work in factories like the
one Ford later introduced. The Industrial Revolution was also responsible for a rise in per-capita
incomes and a strong desire to improve living standards. Furthermore the fact that gold was found
in several places in the United States together with the North American financial system made
finance of new industries possible.
The population of the United States was growing rapidly. The growth was perceived by
entrepreneurs as a chance to expand and justify costly improvements such as mechanization. In
his Wealth of Nations, Smith (1776) explained the importance of an expansion of the market for
the more intensive division of labour  and specialization. The American population consisted for a
great deal of immigrants; this was one of the reasons why the class structure of the United States
had no sharp distinctions like in Europe. From the beginning, new habitants had a culture focused
on economic achievement as a means of acquiring social status (Rossem,  1991). Consequently
mass production goods were quite compatible with the American class structure; large groups in
the United States were willing to purchase identical or similar commodities.
The existing railroads did not offer the wanted flexibility and the horse-powered transporta-
tion was not fast and comfortable enough. Another problem of the existing horse-powered trans-
portation was the polluting factor of the animals in the large cities. Around 1900 in New York
1,200 tons of horse shit and 15,000 litres of horse urine had to be cleared away every day
(Rossem, 1991). The Americans saw the car as a healthy solution for these problems.
Furthermore, petroleum in the United States was cheap and plentiful. The invention of the
pneumatic tyre just before the turn of the century (Dunsheath, 1951) enhanced the appeal of the
car as a solution further.
Having briefly surveyed the socio-economic scene, we now turn to the knowledge and
technological systems associated with the automobile indust ry. In the craft production period
certain production heuristics knowledge was confined to one worker or to one company. There
was no basic knowledge where others could build upon and afterwards could improve it
incrementally. A formal technical education to prepare one to become a car production engineer
or technician did not exist yet. The production consisted of learning by doing and much “guess
work” was involved. However, incrementally the knowledge of building a car improved. With the
enhanced knowledge it became possible to teach others several functions and skills; it became
possible to delegate some administrative responsibilities and to promote division of labour and
specialize the workforce of an automobile making company.
Improvements in technology, like the universal availability of electricity in the late 19th
century followed by very cheap oil in the early 20th century, led to an energy-intensive system of
mass production. Electrical energy could be converted into mechanical energy, and electric
motors could be controlled more quickly and accurately than the traditional power sources. The
old factory system was based on one large steam engine; a breakdown involved the whole factory.
A new system could be based on electric-group-drive and later on unit-drive, this meant one
electric motor for each machine (Devine, 1983). As a result the factory system could be divided
into a number of different platforms powered by independent motors. Furthermore, the
technology involving material handling like steel developed further and was responsible for better
and more efficient production of steel products, like the car. ’
The forces in the industrialized world and especially in the United States in the late 19th and
early 20th century provided a setting that enabled Ford to pioneer a specialized mass production
system, known later as Fordism. Because of the great impact Ford has made on the industrial his-
tory it is instructive to look at the person in some detail and to find out more about his ideas.
Partly because of his rural background, Ford realized that farmers formed an enormous
market potential for the automobile industry. With the Model-T Ford and his technicians had
designed a car that met the needs of a huge mostly rural public. Since the introduction of this
model in 1908, Ford and his workers, who were pushed by a lack of capital, pioneered techniques
to improve the efficiency of production without investing heavily.
In the early days of his company, Ford set up assembly stations on which a whole car was
built, often by one fitter (Womack al, 1990). Around 1908, when he achieved interchangeability
of parts Ford decided that the assembler would perform only one single task and that he would
move from vehicle to vehicle around the assembly hall. The final step towards efficiency involved
one of the biggest contributions of Henry Ford to the industrial landscape of today. In 1913 he
introduced the moving assembly line. In fact this may be seen as a result of the extreme division
of labour. The division of labour, the interchangeability of parts, and the moving assembly line,
together were responsible for the cut in cycle time performed by one worker from one day at the
introduction of the Model-T in 1908 to 1.2 minutes in 1913 (Hounshell, 1984). Within several
years after the introduction of the Model-T, Ford was dominating the American car market with a
market share of around 50% (Nevins, 1954). Ford did not invent all the new methods and
techniques. His achievement lays in weaving together elements of existing technologies into an
efficient mass production system.
The Ford company was a very centralistic and vertically integrated company that believed in
the push concept of production. All major decisions were taken centrally and the departments
were functional departments. The standard in this period was to make everything connected with
the car in-house, from the raw materials on up. The quality and security of suppliers at the time
was low and prices were high. Moreover, the moving assembly line and the high costs of it called
for security in supply of raw materials and semi-finished products; the expensive capital and
labour had to keep moving. Ford owned and controlled the production and distribution of all
materials and parts necessary to the production of cars. He bought steelworks, glassworks and
rubber plantations, and owned railways to transport the needed supplies and to distribute the
finished cars (Womack et al, 1990). A modem, bureaucratic, rational, vertically integrated, and
centrally organized company evolved. Its superiority persuaded other companies and industries to
become followers.
Theoretically, voluntary and reciprocally oriented transactions are regarded as the most
efficient form of exchange (Clegg, 1990). Bureaucracy and vertical integration, rather than
facilitating the market, interpose the heavy hand of centralized authority, which overrides freely
contracting individuals. For all that, bureaucratized organizations began to replace market
exchanges as the major mechanism of control, because it was a more efficient way of doing a
greater volume of business in those days.
An explanation of this paradox is that the market was not functioning optimally in the craft
era. The contracts between actors offered little control over quality and opportunistic behaviour
(Clegg, 1990). Opportunism at that time did not directly result in bankruptcy. The competition
was not fierce and customers were rich and patient. Furthermore, the control over the parts was
minimal, poor quality was only discovered if and when the car broke down,‘and the contractors
were paid for each part they delivered. This way they were not forced to improve quality when
they made bad products.
Furthermore, the knowledge of the process of building a car was better developed at the Ford
company than at his suppliers. The knowledge and economies of scale inside the Ford company
enabled technology to develop any further. As a result, Ford was able to improve mass production
techniques before his suppliers could. He could achieve substantial cost saving by doing every-
thing in-house. Another reason for bringing everything in-house was the fact that Ford wanted
parts with closer tolerances and on tighter delivery schedules. Instead of the arm’s length idea of
purchasing in the open marketplace, he decided to replace this mechanism with, what Chandler
(1977) later called, the “visible hand” of organizational co-ordination.
4 DECENTRALIZATION WITH CO-ORDINATED CONTROL
During the 1920s several new developments transformed the automobile industry and
management and marketing replaced production and finance as the major challenge in the
industry (Chandler, 1964).
In the 1920s the automobile technology made it possible to control assemblies and
subassemblies so as to permit the customer an almost infinite latitude of choice in colour, chassis,
model, equipment, and styling. Furthermore, an ever growing part of the Western society could
afford to buy a car. Ford failed to capitalize on these developments. In 1927, the last year of
production of the Model-T, for the first time more Chevrolets - which is the cheapest model of
General Motors - were sold then Model-Ts.
General Motors found out that face-lifting each model once a year could boost sales. The
result was that the marketing personnel could present brand new models to the public every year.
In the 192Os,  the first car buyers came back for the second round and bringing their old car as
down payment. The creation of a used car market was kept to the mark by the ever-increasing
supply of cars and for a large part by the annual model changes initiated by General Motors.
Because of the growth and because of the competition with Ford, General Motors had to deal
with several problems of management and production. In the 1920s the company pioneered
modem scientific management practice. Sloan quickly saw General Motors had two problems to
solve if it was to succeed at mass production. The company had to manage professionally the
enormous enterprise that the innovation of the mass production system both necessitated and
made possible. And it had to satisfy the ever growing more diversified demand.
Sloan solved the problems facing General Motors with his solution of “decentralized
operations with co-ordinated control”. He distinguished policy from administration by creating
decentralized divisions managed objectively by the numbers from a small corporate headquarters.
He and other senior executives oversaw each of the separate profit centres - car divisions and
component making divisions. To co-ordinate the financial organizations of the divisions and the
central financial staff, Sloan introduced the principle of return on investment into one of the
working instruments for measuring the operations of the divisions (Sloan, 1963).
To satisfy the growing market Sloan brought to the attention that General Motors had no
explicit policy as to the line of cars as a whole. To provide a full range and to avoid duplication,
Sloan introduced an integral car line. He developed a six-model product range that ran from cheap
to expensive. It would accommodate potential buyers of every income throughout their lives. At
that time General Motors was the only automobile maker that provided such an integral car line.
The organizational structure remained largely vertically integrated, though there was a great
deal of decentralized control. The reorganization - from an extremely decentralized organization
(in the case of General Motors) or from an extremely centralized organization (like Ford) - to a
decentralized organization with central control, was pushed by the fact that the business
environment was changing. The depression of 1920-21 resulted in precipitous drop in car sales.
To survive, carmakers had to lower prices and reduce expenses, and to make out of whatever
organisational resources. This was the essence of Sloan’s reorganization of General Motors. He
brought order and effective control into the sprawling structure without sacrificing the advantages
of decentralization, namely flexibility and initiative at various level of management. To this end
the assorted companies that constituted General Motors were converted into autonomous
divisions, with overall policy making and control exercised through the president by an executive
committee and a financial committee. There were also central agencies for research, advertising,
product planning and so on; they were to have an advisory relationship with the divisions (Rae,
1984).”  Sloan’s management system was to become a model for large organization, and was
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adopted by his competit.ors Ford and Chrysler.
Sloan was years a
strategy and organizati
engineer and manager
structure. If we look at
*head  of his time in divorcing policy and administration and in linking
onal structure. In fact, Sloan was practising  the theory of the French
Fayol (1949). It is argued by Chandler (1962) that strategy leads to
the automobile industry and we think of F o r d and Sloan, this argument
seems right. But the next question is: what drives strategy? If we look closer, strategy is for a
great deal market driven. Within 30 years, the automobile market had developed from some rich
people, through the rural market, to a large part of society. Ford would not make a full range of
cars right from the beginning because the market was not ready yet. When General Motors
became successful - in the 1920s and 1930s - it was in essence a successful response to the new
social conditions. Among other developments, the increase of prosperity, the product
improvement, and the beginning of an used car market, played important roles in the automobile
industry in the 1920s and 1930s. Consequently diversification could possibly prove to be a suc-
cessful strategy.
A decentralized organization performs well when the strategy is focused on innovation and a
more centralized organization performs well when the organizational ol$ective  is efficiency
(Hage, 1965). Therefore, the fact that General Motors in the 1920s had more product-innovative
ideas than Ford had, could be an explanation for the more decentralized organizational structure.
Sloan did not ignore the developments in technology and the developments of the market. To
address the more growing diversified needs he tried to adjust the company to the market.
The ideas of Sloan were an important step in the direction of the network organization of the
1990s. The creation of General Motors produced an integrated network of suppliers and different
automobile makers. By treating the divisions as independent businesses, Sloan could better
impose the efficiency discipline of the market, while still preserving the co-ordination advantages
of a unified company.
The Fordistic mass production together with Sloan’s management and marketing techniques
helped the American automobile makers to dominate the world automobile industry for decades.
Companies in practically every other industry adopted similar methods and the automobile
industry became the global symbol of mass production. For this reason in 1999 Fortune voted
Henry Ford best businessman of the century. During the 1960s the international competition in
the automobile industry increased, for a great deal due to the development of the Japanese
automobile industry.
5 LEAN PRODUCTION AND NETWORKING
The Japanese modified the mass production system to suit their domestic market and to
increase their competitiveness by re-thinking the Western ideas of automobile making. The
change was not just in production techniques but also in emphasis: in the way people think and
act. Besides production there was attention for design, supply chain, and distribution (Womack
et al, 1990). The Japanese philosophy of lean production may be seen as an improvement of the
mass production system of Ford and Sloan and as a crucial step to the network organization of
today.
In 1868, after two and a half centuries of isolation, Japan opened her frontiers to the
Western world again. As it turned out, besides several disadvantages, the isolation brought with
it several advantages that accounted for Japan’s rapid transition into a modem industrialized
nation (Morishima, 1982; Takeo, 1983).
5.1 Road to Lean Production in Japan
When Japan came face to face with the West it acknowledged the technology gap. The
Japanese aspired to build a modem state while retaining their way of life. During the 1880s the
Japanese government decided to create a mix of Britain (navy, telegraph, railroads), the United
States (universities), France (school districts, army, legal system), and Germany (constitution
and civil code).
By adapting the imported knowledge and technology to its own cultural heritage and local
conditions, Japan was able to pursue its own unique development. Its small-scale companies
produced traditional commodities, while large companies produced Western goods. At the end
of the 19th century large industrial capitalists (zaibatsu) arose when the government sold
state-operated companies cheaply to the private sector. The large concerns in industries like
machine manufacture and shipbuilding subcontracted heavily; the suppliers were medium and
small-scale companies. These were independent companies, despite receiving technical
guidance, financial assistance, and personnel involvement from the parent company.
The consistent aim of successive governments since the opening of Japan was to build
Japan into a strong country with a top class industry. The government tried to achieve this aim
by adopting a strategy of forming representative teams in the Japanese industrial world, raising
them to the first rank, and then enlarging the level of the team to the rest of Japan, rather than
improving the whole economy gradually. The large industries like steel, electricity, chemicals,
shipbuilding and automobile making were pushed forward, leaving other sectors like
agriculture lagging far behind.
To reduce dominance of foreign cars in Japanese market in the 1920s and early 193Os,  the
government decided to promote the automobile industry by stimulating vertical grouping of
companies in the industry. The upshot was a fast expansion of zaibatsu. These large industrial
networks, which were financially and politically tied to the government, proved to be verv
strong in the decades to come. These “mother-companies” searched and selected suppliers and
brought them under their own auspices. The mother company supported the suppliers
financially and technologically. All the important automobile makers in Japan were, and still
are; part of a zaibatsu.
In response to disadvantages at home Japanese automobile makers became efficient
producers at relatively low volumes of output. The small market demanded small and light
cars that could drive over mountainous terrain and that were suitable for the narrow and bad
roads. The Japanese adjusted the mass production system to their own culture, their own
market, and improve it dramatically to compete internationally. Their strategy was to produce
more economically and in greater variety, and to deliver at least as much quality. The
government stimulated the automobile makers to import knowledge and technology of
automobile making from the West. This was done through a number of tie-ups with British,
French, and American automobile makers and through indirect technology transfer by “reverse
engineering”.
5.2 Toyota
Japanese engineers began learning how to make military trucks during the 1930s. It took
them decades to complete a transition to smaller cars that could suit the Japanese market. Lean
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production was one of a number of reasons why the Japanese managed to match and sometimes
even excel Europeans and Americans in the 1980s and 1990s. Other important developments
that contributed to the success of the Japanese automobile industry were: the government
policy, low capital costs, extensive transfer of technology, intensive competition within own
market, t the oil crises, etc.
In 1948, Toyota began deviating from the most fundamental production technique in the
Western automobile industry. It decided not to push materials and components but to have final
assembly lines pull them through the system. The workers moved backwards to previous
stations to take only what they needed for their operation. In 1950, Toyota extended the pull
concept to marketing through the policy of limiting the production to orders received from
dealers. Because there was not enough work to keep all machines operating constantly, workers
had to operate several machines each, rather than specialize. By 1953, Toyota introduced the
just-in-time concept and a larger responsibility for the workers on the production line.
The Japanese automobile makers in the 1950s decided to refrain from vertical integration
and to subcontract more components, rather than expand in-house capacity to meet new
demand. This stands out as one of the most significant departures from Western practice. The
supplier was given total responsibility for the fitted performance and design of its product.
Extensive subcontracting brought with it the risk of poor quality; until the early 1970s this was
a major problem of the Japanese system. Japanese managers solved this problem by organizing
suppliers into groups and controlling them by detaching executives, extending long-term
contracts, buying the entire output of factories, providing loans of money or equipment, and
offering technical guidance in design, accounting, cost control, production management,
automation, and quality control. The lean producers selected its suppliers on a basis of past
relationship and proven performance rather than on a basis of price bids. The tier one suppliers
were actively involved in the design process of the total car in an early stage. And often they
were responsible for the design and production of a whole component, rather than being
responsible for one of the many parts of one component, like in the West.
To a large degree Toyota built upon Taylor’s work in process analysis, and Ford’s efforts
to create an integrated, smoothly running mass production system. It is following the spirit and
applying it under different set of conditions. More widespread knowledge of car production and
the available ‘more sophisticated technological system provide the ‘conditons  for extensive
subcontracting. Lean production includes teamwork, communication, efficient use of resources,
and continuous improvement. It combines the best features of both craft production and mass
production - the ability to reduce costs per unit and improve quality while providing a wider
range of products. The Japanese decreased levels of in-house vertical integration between parts
productions and final assembly while building up networks of suppliers. The relationship with
suppliers involved a hierarchical network between the automobile maker, tier-one, tier-two and
so on suppliers. The relationships were based on trust rather than on contracts.
5.3 Networking
Because of the success of the Japanese automobile makers European and American
automobile makers adopted lean production in the 1980s and 1990s by learning from the
Japanese. These decades also witness fierce global competition and many strategic alliances.
Dynamic changes within global markets are creating a need for different strategies to gain
competitive advantages. In the 1990s the automobile makers are downsizing to become more
efficient and more effective. What results are network organizations that focus on their core
business.
Today, the automobile industry is in a stage that may be identified as an organizational
network era. The strategy of today is to be a flexible organization that is able to satisfy the
changing needs of the customer. Automobile makers come to realize that full competence in
several areas is almost not possible. However, to stay competitive it is often necessary to posses
in-depth competence and knowledge. In order to solve this dilemma, companies are
downsizing, focusing again on their core competence. Related competencies, often in the value
chain, are purchased or acquired by way of alliances and collaborative arrangements. Core
business and the needs of the customer are the two central themes.
After a difficult period in the American automobile industry around 1990, the industry
recovered well. The recovery of the American “Big Three” automobile makers (General
Motors, Ford, and Chrysler) can be seen as a mode1 for this period. They listen to the
customers, focus on their core competencies, use smaller core teams - involving all
departments to develop new products, and empower their workers; they strive to become
learning organizations (Lienert, 1994). After re-organizing the traditional structures, companies
became network organizations.
5.4 Outsourcing and Information Technology (IT)
Preferences and needs of the customer change in time. If it takes too long to bring a product to
the market the customer is probably already looking for something else. Thus speed is
important, that is the time between receiving information from the market, designing a product,
producing the product, and selling it has to be as short as possible. This cycle time is now being
reduced by two major trends in automotive design.
With the adoption of Japanese approaches, extensive subcontracting is brought back in
operations. In the network organization of today the suppliers are becoming more and more
important. Automobile makers are shifting more design and engineering responsibility onto
suppliers in an effort to cut costs and chop new product development times (Winter, 1995). The
first trend has to do with the involvement of suppliers.
Today the suppliers have the highest level of knowledge and technology in-house to
produce their specific part of the car. As a result of the globalization of the automobile industry
and the success of the Japanese, Western automobile makers are pushing hard to rationalize
their supply chains and to upgrade the quality of their relationships with their suppliers, after
the Japanese example. The supply chain management has penetrated all the major automobile
makers over the world. The suppliers are trusted more and more, as a result a
“store-within-a-store” concept evolves which gives the supplier total responsibility for the
design, distribution, and fitted performance of its product, like in the craft era.
Early involvement of suppliers in product development can improve effectiveness and
efficiency of the design process. Simultaneous development can reduce design time, and the
advises and expertise of suppliers can push the development of design in an early stage into the
right direction. It is no longer the most economic way for automobile makers to tell their
suppliers exactly what to produce and how to do it.
The other trend involves the technology of the related industries, which has always been
playing an important role in the automobile industry. If we look back, the meatpacking
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industry, the chemical industry, the energy industry, et cetera have all been contributing largely
to the development of the automobile industry. Also now related industries play important roles
in the industry. The recent improvements in IT make possible huge improvements in
effectiveness and efficiency of each component of the value chain of the car. Moreover they
push radical changes in the automobile industry that are supportive to the structure of the
network organization. Communication is one of the keys to success with the (global) networks.
Electronic mail systems are used as a messaging backbone for the huge global corporate
networks, to improve efficiency, effectiveness, and speed of communication (Schwartz, 1996).
Changes in the automobile industry require large-scale introduction of robotics, changes in
organization of design, production, and distribution. Aided by computer-based control,
diversity is made more manageable. More innovative and creative organizations have become
commonplace. Industrial design and styling software tools are used to provide control over
aesthetics, to improve quality, to lower costs, and to reduce development time in order to
respond quickly to the needs of individual target markets (Snow, 1996). The number of
prototypes can be minimized - almost all components and functions of a car can be modeled
before building the whole car. Even a complete car can be modeled, the three dimensional
models can be run through “virtual” wind tunnels and crash tests. The results almost perfectly
match what happens when real prototypes out of metal and glass are being built.
6 CONCLUDING
In the early days of the automobile industry, the dominant organization form is that of a
network organisation. The technology used then was essentially that of a craft industry, the
knowledge then was not widespread, and the demand of cars limited to the social elites. The
genius of Ford was to transform the whole industry by creating the centralised  hierarchical
organization which, under the obtaining conditions then, proved to be a more suitable form for
incorporating related innovations, developing knowledge and techniques. Together with the
advent of electricity, he and his associates were able to usher in the mass production based on
the assembly line. The result was a much cheaper and higher quality car. This, together with
economic and social change, was to mean the mass market for the industry.
However, time did not stand still and things changed. Technical schools conducted courses
in mechanical engineering, knowledge improved and diffused to the wider circles in society.
With increasing wealth and changing taste, people began to demand for more than Ford was
prepared to offer. This provided the scope for Sloan to modify the business practice of Ford and
to innovate the decentralized organization with tight financial control, and to create a used car
market. The achievements of Ford and Sloan were such that the hierarchical organization was
perceived to be the model modem organisation which was copied in other industrial and
business firms, and its model role was to last until the entry of the network organisation.
An intermediate step to network organization was that of lean production, in itself an
enormous improvement of the mass production system of the West. It is essentially a network
of production carried by companies controlled by a mother zaibatsu company. The
organizational structure and strategy evolved as a result of the market forces, the
interventionist role of the government, and the traditional relationships in the Japanese
industries. Relying on the imported knowledge and technology was not enough. In order to
close the gap between itself and the West, the Japanese car industry has to continuously
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involve the suppliers. The result was that the technological level improved tremendously and a
new system of production came into being. Western carmakers, operating in a fiercely
competitive environment, they appreciated the virtues of the innovation of their Japanese
counterparts. They successfully incorporated extensive subcontracting and a pull concept, but
without their suppliers having to operate under the aegis of a zaibatsu. The operation of
network organization is facilitated by advanced information and communication technology.
As it turns out, we have come a big round to be back at the network organization which was in
operation before the time of Ford. The case of the car industry suggests that the merits of a
given structure and strategy are contingent on some existing conditions. Our study finds that
the conditions for the car industry are business environment, knowledge system and
technological system. Further research is needed to see if there are more forces at work, and if
our ideas are applicable to other industries, as well as the their broader implications.
Before leaving this paper, we would like to observe that innovation in the car industry
illustrates the powerful idea of Schumpeter(l934) that innovation consists of a new
combination (neue Kombination) of existing practices and technologies. At the same time, the
automobile industry provides a case that contradicts Schumpeter (1987)‘s prediction that
institutionalization of research and development did not decelerate innovation in modem
economies; in fact it accelerated it.
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